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STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Adler believes oral argument would be helpful to the Court to fully understand 
and properly resolve this appeal.  Simply understood, this case rests on the Court’s 
resolution of whether a trademark holder can plausibly allege a likelihood of confusion 
arising from a competitor’s use of his marks for online mobile keyword search engine 
ads as part of a bait-and-switch scheme.  The district court created a per se rule—allowing 
claims for confusion to be alleged when the mark is visible to consumers in the ad itself, 
but not otherwise.1  As set forth herein, the ruling is contrary to existing Fifth Circuit 
trademark jurisprudence.  Adler believes the technologies involved in the dispute, 
confusion over the terms used by the parties in briefing, and the lack of any hearings 
below contributed to the outcome.  Despite the best efforts at briefing by both sides, 
questions will likely remain.  Oral argument would provide the Court with an 
opportunity to resolve any questions raised by the parties’ briefs.    
                                           
1 Compare ROA.189-206, with ROA.238-61. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
This is an action for trademark infringement and unfair competition brought by 
Jim Adler and Jim S. Alder, P.C. (collectively “Adler”) against Lauren Von McNeil, 
McNeil Consultants, LLC, and Quintessa Marketing, LLC (collectively “McNeil”), 
under the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. (“Lanham Act”), and related 
state law claims.  Adler alleges McNeil is using Adler’s registered marks as keywords for 
online search engine ads as part of a bait-and-switch scheme to confuse consumers 
searching for Adler on mobile devices into instead calling McNeil by mistake.2  The 
district court had jurisdiction over Adler’s claims under the 15 U.S.C. §1121, and 28 
U.S.C. §1331 and §1338, and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). 
On August 29, 2020, the court entered a final order granting McNeil’s Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, believing Adler could not, as a matter of law, state a claim 
for infringement and unfair competition because McNeil does not include Adler’s 
marks in the text of ads visible to consumers.  The court denied as futile Adler’s motion 
to amend and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.  
The same day, the court entered a final judgment as to all parties and claims.3  Adler 
timely appealed on September 10, 2020.4  The Court has jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. 
§1291, to review whether Adler sufficiently pleaded claims under the Lanham Act.  








ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1.   Does Adler state a plausible claim for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition against McNeil based on her intentional use of his registered marks in an 
online bait-and-switch scheme? 
2.   Can someone who using a competitor’s marks as online keywords for search 
engine ads as part of bait-and-switch scheme shield their conduct from a trademark 
infringement claim by not visibly incorporating the mark in the text of the ad? 
3.   Should the question of whether a competitor’s use of a trademark creates a 
likelihood of confusion—a fact issue—be decided by the court at the motion to dismiss 
stage? 
4.   In determining whether a competitor’s use of a trademark supports a plausible 
claim for confusion, should a trial court consider the “digits of confusion” articulated 
by the Fifth Circuit? 
5.   If the court believed Adler had not sufficiently alleged a plausible basis for a 
likelihood of confusion, should it have allowed him to amend his complaint to include 
survey evidence showing that McNeil’s ads yield a net confusion rate of 34% to 44%? 
 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While involving modern technology, this case centers on a classic bait-and-switch 
scheme run on unsuspecting consumers by using a famous competitor’s trademarks to 
steal clients.  Defendants-Appellees Lauren Von McNeil, McNeil Consultants, LLC, 
and Quintessa Marketing, LLC (collectively “McNeil”) run the scheme using the 
registered marks of Jim Adler and Jim S. Alder, P.C (collectively “Adler”) in keyword 
ads for Google searches made on mobile devices.  McNeil—an online “lead generator” 
who makes money selling leads for personal injury cases to attorneys—uses Adler’s 
marks to intentionally manipulate search engine results on mobile devices and confuse 
consumers searching for Adler to instead call McNeil by mistake.5 
McNeil uses Adler’s marks for “click-to-call” ads, a search-engine tool targeting 
mobile users.  Instead of linking to a website, a click-to-call ad makes the device place 
a call.  McNeil uses Adler’s marks with confusingly designed click-to-call ads and 
manipulates search results to put her own ads next to—often before—Adler’s in search 
results.  McNeil does so knowing consumers specifically searching for Adler will be 
confused into calling McNeil instead.  Once called, McNeil continues the ruse by 
making consumers believe she is affiliated with Adler, ultimately trying to convince 
them to hire different lawyers through referral.6  This appeal turns on whether McNeil’s 
use of Adler’s marks to confuse consumers is actionable under the Lanham Act.  
                                           
5 ROA.85-86, 93-95. 
6 ROA.85-86, 93-95. 




A. Jim Adler, widely known as the Texas Hammer, is a famous Texas 
personal injury lawyer, who owns well-known trademarks. 
Jim Adler has become widely known across Texas as a result of his over fifty 
years (and counting) legal career.  He founded a preeminent Texas personal injury law 
firm, representing injured parties in all types of cases, with a particular focus on auto 
and commercial vehicle/eighteen-wheeler accidents.  The firm has grown into one of 
the largest, most widely-recognized and successful personal injury law firms in Texas.  
It currently has four offices in Houston, Dallas, San Antonio and Channelview, and 
employs approximately 300 people, including 27 lawyers.7 
Adler’s success is the result of decades of hard work building a reputation for 
aggressively representing Texas injury victims.  Adler has also expended significant 
effort and expense to build his reputation and name recognition throughout Texas.  
After a 1977 Supreme Court decision upheld the First Amendment right of attorneys 
to advertise, Adler became one of the first Texas lawyers to advertise on television.  As 
the Dallas Business Journal wrote in 2015, “Jim Adler, ‘The Texas Hammer,’ has used 
an aggressive memorable advertising campaign to make his law firm a household name 
in several areas of the state.”  It noted, “[a]s far as personal injury lawyers go, Jim Adler 
might be the most well known in Texas.” 8    
                                           
7 ROA.86-87. 
8 ROA.87. 




Since at least the 1990s, Adler has continuously used several trademarks to 
identify and promote his firm, including JIM ADLER, THE HAMMER, THE TEXAS 
HAMMER, and EL MARTILLO TEJANO (collectively, the “Adler Marks”).  The 
Adler Marks are inherently distinctive and serve to identify Adler to consumers.  Adler 
owns incontestable federal registrations for each of the Adler Marks.9 
To build strong brand recognition, Adler uses the Adler Marks to advertise on 
television, radio, billboards, and the internet.  Adler’s television advertising reaches over 
15 million people—more than half of all Texans.  Adler’s radio advertising reaches over 
12 million Texans.  And Adler’s billboards generate 25 to 30 million impressions per 
week.  Since 2000, Adler has spent over $100 million on ads targeting the Houston, San 
Antonio, and Dallas-Fort Worth markets.10 
Adler’s advertisements, which prominently incorporate the Adler Marks, have 
enabled Adler to develop strong brand recognition in Texas.  In 2007, the Houston 
Chronicle wrote that, “[e]verbody knows what Adler sounds like from his ceaseless TV 
commercials.”  In 2015, the Dallas Morning News named an Adler television 
commercial to a list of five of the most memorable attorney ads in Dallas-Fort Worth.  
And in 2019, a montage of Adler’s television ads was featured on an episode of Last 
Week Tonight with John Oliver, an Emmy-award winning HBO news satire program 
                                           
9 ROA.88. 
10 ROA.88-90. 




broadcast around the globe.  As a result of Adler’s long use and promotion, the Adler 
Marks have become distinctive to designate Adler, and consumers widely recognize and 
associate the Adler Marks with Adler. 11 
B. Adler uses the Adler Marks to advertise extensively to consumers online. 
As with television, Adler was an early leader among lawyers in using the internet 
to advertise legal services.  Since 1997, Adler has marketed legal services through 
jimadler.com, and in 2018 the site averaged more than 52,000 visitors per month.  A 
substantial part of Adler’s online advertising effort and budget is spent on purchasing 
keyword search engine advertising to drive internet traffic to Adler.12    
Adler purchases keyword search engine ads only for the Adler Marks or generic 
terms related to the type of cases he handles.  For example, Adler purchases keyword 
ads for “Jim Adler” or “Texas Hammer,” as well as when someone searches for “car 
accident lawyer.”  Adler does not purchase keywords related to any other lawyer’s firm, 
name, or mark.  The vast majority of keyword ads Adler purchases are for someone 
searching specifically for the Adler Marks, rather than generic terms. 13   








Every year, Adler spends hundred-of-thousands of dollars purchasing keyword 
search engine ads for the Adler Marks.  Here is an example of one such advertisement, 
as it appeared in a Google search:14 
 
C. McNeil uses Adler’s marks as part of a high-tech bait-and-switch scheme, 
designed to confuse and deceive consumers searching specifically for 
Adler into calling McNeil by mistake. 
McNeil is not a lawyer, but instead an online “lead generator” who operates a 
lawyer referral website and call center, and is paid by other lawyers to solicit and refer 
to them leads for personal injury cases.  To generate lucrative referrals, McNeil has 
intentionally engaged in a scheme to profit off Adler’s reputation and the Adler Marks.  
McNeil’s scheme is aimed at deceptively inducing prospective clients who are using 
mobile devices to specifically seek out Adler into mistakenly contacting McNeil and 
engaging lawyers referred through McNeil instead.15 
                                           
14 ROA.92. 
15 ROA.93. 




To carry out the scheme, McNeil purchases the Adler Marks as keywords for 
advertisements on mobile devices through Google’s search engine that employ the 
“click-to-call” feature.  McNeil uses click-to-call ads because of the likelihood 
consumers will be confused and click on McNeil’s ad without realizing it is not affiliated 
with Adler.  As a result, Google searches for Adler’s marks, including “JIM ADLER,” 
“THE TEXAS HAMMER,” and “EL MARTILLO TEJANO,” on mobile devices 
show search results displaying McNeil’s ads—without any source identifier—directly 
below one or more of the Adler Marks, as shown in these two examples:16  
 
McNeil’s ads do not identify herself as a lawyer referral service or any particular 
lawyer or law firm as the source of the ad.  Instead, the ads are intentionally designed 
to display terms consumers might associate with any personal injury firm.  Consumers 
specifically searching for Adler are likely to believe McNeil’s ads are somehow affiliated 
with Adler.  This is particularly true on mobile devices, where consumers are quickly 
                                           
16 ROA.93-94. 




searching, often during the stressful aftermath of an accident, the typeface of the ads is 
much smaller, and the only content displayed on the screen is an ad directly below one 
or more of the Adler Marks, which the consumer has entered as a search term.17 
As part of the scheme, McNeil bids increasingly higher amounts for the Adler 
Marks as keyword ads.  The effect of McNeil’s bidding not only drives up the cost for 
Adler to purchase his own marks, but also allows McNeil to place her ads next to and 
often before Adler’s ads and immediately below the Adler Marks (i.e., at the top of the 
search-results).  By having her own nondescript, click-to-call ad next to or before 
Adler’s ad and below the Adler Marks, McNeil is able to cause a higher number of 
confused consumers searching for Adler to instead mistakenly call McNeil.18   
McNeil’s scheme is highly effective at confusing and deceiving consumers 
searching specifically for Adler into calling her by mistake.  Adler commissioned a 
double-blind survey of 400 Texas residents who have sought in the past, or would seek 
in the near future, the services of a personal injury lawyer through an online search.  
The survey, which was conducted on mobile devices, showed participants search results 
with McNeil’s and Adler’s actual ads as triggered by a Google search for one of the 
Adler Marks.  The survey yielded a net confusion rate of between 34% and 44%—
                                           
17 ROA.93-94. 
18 ROA.94-95. 




meaning between 34% and 44% of participants clicked on McNeil’s ad believing it was 
put out by, affiliated or associated with, or approved by Adler.19 
McNeil’s scheme does not end when a confused consumer clicks on her ad by 
mistake.  Because she uses click-to-call ads, McNeil’s ads do not give the consumer the 
ability to click through to a separate website or garner any further information.  Instead, 
when the ad is touched, the mobile device automatically initiates a call to McNeil’s call 
center.  McNeil’s call-center employees are trained to answer these calls with generic 
greetings such as “did you have an accident” or “tell me about your accident.”  McNeil’s 
scheme deceives consumers into continuing to believe they have contacted Adler or 
someone affiliated with Adler.  The goal is to keep confused consumers who were 
searching specifically for Adler on the phone and talking to McNeil’s employees long 
enough to build a rapport and ultimately convince them to engage lawyers referred 
through McNeil.20  
D. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, believing Adler could not state a 
claim for likelihood of confusion against McNeil because his marks are 
not visible in the text of the ads. 
McNeil filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Adler’s claims, arguing her use of 
Adler’s marks was not actionable because the marks were not visible in the ads.21  In 
response, Adler denied that his claim was based solely on McNeil’s purchase of 
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keywords, argued that the marks did not have to be visible to consumers in the 
advertisement itself for McNeil’s use of the marks to be actionable, and asserted that 
under the Fifth Circuit’s “digits of confusion” he had stated a plausible claim for 
confusion.22  While the motion was pending, the district court assigned the case for all 
pretrial matters to the Magistrate Judge, along with a similar case Adler had filed against 
a competing law firm (the “Reyes case”) represented by the same attorneys as McNeil 
with a similar Rule 12(b) motion pending.23 
On the mostly identical Rule 12(b)(6) motions involving extremely similar 
infringement claims, the Magistrate Judge reached opposite recommendations in the 
two cases.  First, in the Reyes case, the judge recommended denying the motion to 
dismiss, finding Adler pleaded a plausible claim for trademark infringement.24  In 
recommending the motion be denied, the Magistrate Judge correctly applied the Fifth 
Circuit’s “digits of confusion,” finding each relevant factor weighed in Adler’s favor,25 
and specifically rejected the argument that likelihood of confusion could not be shown 
because the Adler Marks did not appear in the text of the ads.26   
Days later, the Magistrate Judge recommended granting McNeil’s motion to 
dismiss.  While recognizing that “[a] defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s marks in keyword 
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search engine ads to direct users to the defendant may be unlawful if it causes consumer 
confusion,”27 the Magistrate Judge found that when the ad does not visibly incorporate 
the plaintiff’s mark in its text, there can be no likelihood of confusion as a matter of 
law.28  The Magistrate Judge also found that, because no part of Adler’s marks visibly 
appeared in the text of McNeil’s ads, there was no need to consider the Fifth Circuit’s 
digits of confusion to determine if Adler alleged a plausible claim for likelihood of 
confusion.29  Read in conjunction with Reyes, the Magistrate Judge appeared to believe 
a claim could be asserted against Reyes because he had included the word “hammer” in 
some of his ads, while McNeil had not.30   
Adler filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and a motion 
for leave to file an amended complaint to include his new survey evidence showing the 
extensive amount of confusion caused by McNeil’s ads.31  The district court agreed with 
and accepted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation as its own, finding Adler could 
not state a claim for trademark infringement and unfair competition as a matter of law 
because McNeil did not include the Adler Marks in the visible text of the ads.  The 
court likewise denied the motion to amend as futile.32  This appeal followed.33  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under federal law, a trademark owner has the right to protect his marks from 
use by a competitor to confuse and deceive consumers.  That is exactly what the 
complaint alleges here: McNeil is intentionally using Adler’s registered marks for 
keyword search engine ads as part of an online bait-and-switch scheme designed to 
confuse and deceive consumers specifically searching for Adler into mistakenly calling 
McNeil instead.  Adler’s allegations are more than sufficient to state plausible claims 
under the Lanham Act for infringement and unfair competition. 
The district court dismissed, however, believing Adler could not state a plausible 
claim for likelihood of confusion because McNeil’s use of his marks as keywords is not 
visible in the text of her ads.  If adopted, the district court’s per se approach would 
severely erode the ability of trademark holders to protect against the misuse of their 
marks online.  Tellingly, just days after the lower court’s decision, another district judge 
in the Northern District of Texas—faced with identical claims brought by another 
attorney against McNeil—specifically rejected the district court’s reasoning and 
decision in this case.   
Likewise, this Court has previously rejected a per se approach to determining 
likelihood of confusion in cases involving online, invisible use of another’s trademarks 
(e.g. meta tags and keywords).  Instead, the Court has recognized that whether an owner 
can prevail on such a claim depends on if they can ultimately prove the use of the mark 




“actually or initially confused any consumers”—which is a fact question.  Other Circuits 
and district courts have repeatedly held that nonvisible use of another’s trademark 
online can state a claim for infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act.  
This approach makes sense because the gravamen of any claim for trademark 
infringement is simply whether the use of the mark is likely to cause confusion.   
This case is not about a competitor’s purchase of keywords for legitimate 
purposes.  Adler’s complaint alleges McNeil uses his marks as part of an intentional 
bait-and-switch scheme.  Liability is based not on the purchase of Adler’s marks as 
keywords in a vacuum, but instead by the manner in which McNeil is using those 
purchased keywords to intentionally mislead, confuse, and misdirect consumers 
searching specifically for Adler.  McNeil’s bait-and-switch scheme is exactly the type of 
conduct courts have long recognized as supporting a claim for initial-interest confusion 
and unfair competition in search-engine cases.  Adler has stated a plausible claim for 
likelihood of confusion, and McNeil cannot avoid liability for her scheme to use Adler’s 
marks to confuse and lure away consumers. 
Applying the Fifth Circuit’s “digits of confusion” to this case supports a finding 
that Adler has alleged a plausible claim for likelihood of confusion.   The district court 
was wrong to believe likelihood of confusion could be decided—as a matter of law, 
before any discovery, and without considering the Court’s digits of confusion—based 
solely on whether the marks were visible to consumers in the text of McNeil’s ads.        





I. The issues in this appeal are subject to de novo review, with the Court 
deciding whether and by what standard a trademark owner can plausibly 
allege likelihood of confusion for the use of its mark in an online bait-and-
switch scheme. 
The resolution of this case depends on whether the intentional, deceiving use of 
a trademark owner’s marks as keywords, in an online bait-and-switch scheme, can give 
rise to a plausible claim of trademark infringement.  Answering this question “no”—as 
the district court incorrectly did—will significantly diminish a trademark owner’s rights 
to the use of its brand online and improperly thwart the owner’s ability to protect 
consumers from these types of online schemes.   
While arising in the context of mobile online advertising, “[s]tripped of its high-
tech veneer, this is a pretty straightforward trademark-infringement case.”  Engineered 
Tax Servs., Inc. v. Scarpello Consulting, Inc., 958 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (reversing 
summary judgment in a keyword advertising trademark infringement case).  “Although 
the details may seem complicated because the alleged infringement occurred as part of 
an internet advertisement placed with the world’s leading search engine, Google, the 
technological minutiae don’t much matter to the resolution of this appeal.”  Id.   
To state a claim under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) it 
owns a legally protectable mark; and (2) the defendant’s use of the mark creates a 
likelihood of confusion as to source, affiliation or sponsorship.  Viacom Int’l v. IJR 
Capital Invs., LLC., 891 F.3d 178, 185 (5th Cir. 2018).  The district court recognized that 




McNeil does not dispute Adler owns legally-protected marks, and challenges only the 
likelihood of confusion element.34  The court granted McNeil’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
finding Adler could not allege a plausible claim for likelihood of confusion as a matter 
of law because the marks are not visible in the text of McNeil’s ads.35  The court also 
held that, as a matter of law, there was no likelihood of confusion without the need to 
consider the Fifth Circuit’s “digits of confusion.”36  
The Court reviews dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, “accepting all well-
pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.”  Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 2013).  Whether a defendant’s use 
of the plaintiff’s mark creates a likelihood of confusion is a question of fact.  Viacom 
Int’l, 891 F.3d at 192.  However, whether a party is entitled to judgment on likelihood 
of confusion as a matter of law is reviewed de novo.  Id.  Moreover, when the district 
court applies the wrong legal standard for determining likelihood of confusion, the 
Court will review that decision de novo.  Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 
(5th Cir. 1998).  To survive dismissal, a complaint must allege sufficient facts, accepted 
as true, to state a plausible claim for relief.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  
Adler’s complaint easily meets that standard, and the court was wrong to dismiss. 
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II. Adler’s complaint pleads plausible claims for trademark infringement and 
unfair competition based on McNeil’s scheme to use Adler’s marks to 
confuse and deceive consumers searching for Adler on mobile devices. 
This case is not about the use of keywords for legitimate comparative advertising.  
McNeil is intentionally using Adler’s marks to confuse and deceive consumers searching 
specifically for Adler on their phones, to lure them into instead calling her by mistake.37  
Under the district court’s approach, any competitor can use another’s registered marks 
to deliberately confuse and mislead consumers, so long as the marks do not appear in 
the text of the ad.38  But the district court’s per se approach to likelihood of confusion 
improperly erodes the rights of trademark owners online.  Trademark law allows an 
owner to stop others from using its marks to confuse and deceive consumers.  
The district court’s per se approach is contrary to the case law of the Fifth Circuit, 
other Circuits, and multiple district courts—which have repeatedly recognized a viable 
infringement claim for the online use of another’s mark to confuse consumers, even if 
the mark is not visible.  In fact, just days after the lower court’s decision, another district 
judge in the Northern District of Texas—faced with identical claims brought by another 
attorney against McNeil—specifically rejected the lower court’s decision in this case.  
Ben Abbott & Assocs., PLLC v. Quintessa LLC, No. 3:20-cv-1790-B, 2020 WL 5633006, 
at *5-6, n.6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2020) (finding allegations of McNeil’s use of keywords 
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in identical online scheme was sufficient to state a claim for likelihood of confusion).  
The Court should do the same.   
A. McNeil’s confusing and deceptive use of Adler’s trademarks as 
keywords is actionable regardless of whether the marks are visible 
in the deceptive ad itself. 
The basis of the district court’s reasoning—that Adler’s trademarks must visibly39 
appear in the text of McNeil’s ads for liability to arise—is simply wrong.  In the context 
of online advertising, a trademark claim “does not fail for lacking proof that the 
trademark itself is visible to consumers.”  Am. CAN! v. Car Donations Found., No. 18-
CV-1709, 2019 WL 1112667, at *10 (N.D. Tex. March 11, 2019).  Keyword bidding is 
often referred to as “non-consumer-facing” because the consumer has no way of 
knowing which terms an advertiser bid on.  See Edible Arrangements, LLC v. Provide 
Commerce, Inc., No. 14-CV-250, 2016 WL 4074121, at *11 (D. Conn. July 29, 2016).  In 
cases involving non-visible uses of trademarks online, courts have repeatedly rejected 
the argument that the mark must be visible to the consumer to state a claim for 
infringement. 
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“In the Fifth Circuit, trademark visibility has not been recognized as necessary 
to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.”  Am. CAN!, 2019 WL 1112667, at *10.  
In Am. Can!, a case involving invisible website metatags, the court rejected a similar 
motion to dismiss based on the argument that “the mark does not visibly appear in the 
search results.”  Id. at *9.  The court recognized that “the precedent of this court does 
not suggest that lack of trademark visibility is determinative in keyword advertising 
cases, which similarly concern visible search results placement caused by invisible use 
of a trademark.”  Id. at *10 (citing Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 781 F. Supp. 2d 396, 
423 (N.D. Tex. 2011)).  The court held that a party can plausibly state an actionable 
claim for trademark infringement despite the fact that the mark itself was not visible to 
consumers.  Id. at *9-10.   
This approach makes sense given that confusion as to source is the gravamen of 
trademark infringement.  Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 229 
(5th Cir. 2009).  The America CAN! court noted that “the defendants do not cite any 
Fifth Circuit precedent in support of their argument” that an online use of a mark had 
to be visible to serve as a basis for likelihood of confusion.  2019 WL 1112667, at *9.  
The same is true here, as neither the lower court nor McNeil cite any Fifth Circuit 
authority to support the far-reaching holding that a plaintiff’s marks must be visible to 
consumers in the text of the defendant’s ads.   




In reality, the Court has held the opposite, recognizing that non-consumer-facing 
use of another’s trademark online can state a claim for trademark infringement on proof 
the mark was used illegitimately or is likely to cause confusion.  See Sw. Recreational Indus., 
Inc. v. FieldTurf, Inc., No. 01-50073, 2002 WL 32783971, at *7-8 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2002).  
Southwest Recreational involved a claim that went to trial on the use of a competitor’s 
marks in invisible meta tags on a website.  Id.  While noting that use of the marks was 
invisible to consumers, the Court held that the gravamen for any action of trademark 
infringement was simply whether the use of the mark was likely to cause confusion, 
which it noted is a fact question in the Fifth Circuit.  Id.  The Court rejected the idea 
that the law created a per se rule for online, non-visible use of a mark and infringement.  
Id.  Instead, likelihood of confusion caused by the use of another’s trademarks as 
invisible meta tags online depends on whether the trademark owner can prove that the 
use of the mark “actually or initially confused any consumers.”  Id.  
In College Network, the Court held that use of another’s trademark as a keyword 
in search engine ads can properly raise a fact issue on likelihood of confusion for the 
jury to resolve.  College Network, Inc. v. Moore Educ. Publishers, Inc., 378 F. App’x 403, 414 
n.5 (5th Cir. 2010).  Like here, in College Network the trademark owner alleged a 
competitor had used its marks as keywords on Google and Yahoo search engine ads.  
Id. at 405-06.  In reviewing the jury’s finding of no likelihood of confusion, the Court 
noted that, “[t]he jury was permitted to view the key-word search process and visually 




compare the companies’ websites.”  Id. at 414 n.5.  The same should be true here: Adler 
has sufficiently pleaded an allegation that McNeil’s use of his marks as keywords to 
further her bait-and-switch scheme creates a likelihood of confusion that needs to be 
resolved by a factfinder.     
Other Circuits have similarly held that non-visible use of another’s trademark on 
the internet can state a claim for trademark infringement and unfair competition under 
the Lanham Act.  See, e.g., Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 60-
61 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding likelihood-of-confusion finding despite fact that 
unauthorized use of marks was hidden from view online); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac 
Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding likelihood of initial-interest 
confusion actionable under Lanham Act where competitor used marks as meta tags to 
lure consumers searching for competitor’s products); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast 
Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1061-65 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding use of competitor’s marks 
as meta tags and buried code created likelihood of confusion and was prohibited by 
Lanham Act); Hearts on Fire Co., LLC v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274, 288 (D. 
Mass. 2009) (denying Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss trademark claims in keyword 
search engine case even though defendant’s ad did not contain the mark). 
The law simply does not support the notion that a trademark owner cannot 
protect against a likelihood of confusion caused by non-visible use of its marks on the 
internet simply because the mark does not appear in the text of an online advertisement.  




The Supreme Court has recognized that federal trademark law is designed to support 
the free flow of commerce and foster competition.  USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 
S.Ct. 2298, 2302 (2020).  It does so by giving the trademark owner the right to guard 
against a third party’s misuse of its mark in order to secure the goodwill of its business 
and protect the ability of consumers to distinguish between competing producers.  Id.  
Imposing a “visibility” requirement, as the district court did here, would prevent Adler 
and countless other trademark owners from protecting their marks from being used in 
bait-and switch schemes designed to confuse and deceive consumers online. 
B. Adler’s complaint is not about the legitimate purchase of 
keywords—he properly pleads claims for initial-interest confusion 
based on McNeil’s misuse of Adler’s marks as part of a scheme to 
confuse and lure away consumers. 
Believing the marks have to be visible in the text of the ads for a trademark claim, 
the district court misconstrued Adler’s allegations against McNeil as complaining 
exclusively about the purchase of his marks as keywords.40  To the contrary, Adler’s 
complaint is based on McNeil’s use of those keywords to further an intentional bait-
and-switch scheme which involves a chain of conduct that begins with the purchase of 
Adler’s trademarks as keywords and ends with McNeil confusing consumers and luring 
them away from Adler.   
McNeil’s use of Adler’s marks to intentionally confuse and lure consumers on 
mobile devices is more than sufficient to state a claim of trademark infringement and 
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unfair competition.  Adler alleges McNeil: (1) purchases the Adler Marks for internet 
advertisements targeting consumers searching for Adler on mobile devices because 
consumers are more likely to be confused in the mobile context; (2) uses the Adler 
Marks as keywords for deliberately vague ads with no source identifier so consumers 
searching for Adler will think McNeil’s ad is associated with Adler; (3) uses click-to-call 
technology so as not to reveal the source of the ad and so that consumers searching for 
Adler will be confused and mistakenly call McNeil without realizing she is not Adler or 
associated with Adler; (4) bids increasing higher amounts so that her ads are placed 
immediately below the Adler Marks and before Adler’s ads;  and (5) has call-center 
operators follow scripts designed to further confuse callers seeking Adler in the hopes 
of keeping them on the phone, building rapport, and ultimately convincing them to hire 
lawyers referred through McNeil.41  Through this scheme, McNeil wrongly induces 
prospective clients trying to reach Adler into instead contacting her and engaging 
lawyers referred by her—confusing and luring away consumers is the entire reason for 
her use of Adler’s marks as keywords. 
The district court found this same conduct sufficient to state a plausible claim in 
the companion Reyes case, noting there that Adler “alleges more than simply the 
purchase of a competitor’s trademarks.”42  Likewise, it is the same conduct by McNeil 
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that the Abbott court recognized as alleging more than just the purchase of keywords.  
Ben Abbott & Assocs., 2020 WL 5633006, at *4-5.   
There is no dispute in this case that the mere purchase of a competitor’s mark 
for keyword searches (e.g., for comparative advertising) does not, in itself, give rise to 
trademark infringement.  But that argument “misses the point—the conduct at issue is 
not a defendant’s keyword bidding, considered in a vacuum, but rather the effect of the 
keyword bidding in conjunction with the defendant’s advertisements.”  Edible 
Arrangements, 2016 WL 4074121, at *11.  Liability for trademark infringement depends 
on the nature of the defendant’s use, “as every use of a mark is different.”  Mary Kay, 
Inc. v. Weber, 661 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646 (N.D. Tex. 2009).  The crux of the issue is 
whether a defendant’s keyword purchase, combined with the look and placement of its 
ad using the keyword, creates a search-result page likely to mislead, confuse, or misdirect 
a consumer searching for plaintiff’s brand to defendant.  See Edible Arrangements, 2016 
WL 4074121, at *11 (denying summary judgment on trademark infringement, 
trademark dilution, and unfair competition claims based on competitor’s keyword 
advertisements).   
Someone using a third party’s trademarks for search-engine ads should use 
caution every time they use the marks, and any use of the marks without an explanation 
that they are not and have no affiliation with the mark owner is suspect.  Mary Kay, 661 
F. Supp. 2d at 646.  A competitor’s use of a third party’s mark as a keyword for search-




engine ads is “suspect” in this sense.  See Abraham, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 423.  Here, 
McNeil’s use of Adler’s marks is more than suspect—the entire purpose of using 
Adler’s marks as keywords without any source identifier in the ads themselves is to 
confuse and lure away consumers from Adler to McNeil. 
Adler’s complaint alleges McNeil acted with the intent to confuse and deceive. 
Had the district court denied McNeil’s motion to dismiss and allowed the case to 
proceed to discovery—as it should have—Adler would have developed evidence to 
show McNeil’s bad-faith intent. When a trademark owner shows intent to confuse, this 
Court has used that fact alone to justify inferring a likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., Bd. 
of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 
481 (5th Cir. 2008). 
McNeil’s bait-and-switch scheme is exactly the type of conduct courts have long 
recognized as supporting a claim for “initial-interest” confusion and unfair competition 
in search-engine cases where the “defendant purchases plaintiff’s trademark as a search 
engine keyword to divert users to the defendant’s website.”  EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue 
Corp., 49 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 2014).  A claim of initial-interest confusion 
arises when another party’s mark is used to lead the consumer astray on false pretenses 
and into the arms of a competitor. Hearts on Fire, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 284.  Unlike 
legitimate comparative advertising, the use of a competitor’s mark in a bait-and-switch 
scenario is “clearly actionable” as initial-interest confusion.  See Alzheimer’s Disease & 




Related Disorders Ass’n, Inc. v. Alzheimer’s Found. of Am., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 260, 286 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).  “Initial interest confusion in the internet context derives from the 
unauthorized use of trademarks to divert internet traffic, thereby capitalizing on a 
trademark holder’s goodwill.”  Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th 
Cir. 2006). 
For instance, in Australian Gold, the Tenth Circuit held that use of a competitor’s 
marks as meta tags and payment for a preferred position on search-results pages when 
consumers searched for the competitor’s marks—despite the fact it was not selling the 
competitor’s products—supported a finding the defendant was using the marks in 
violation of the Lanham Act to confuse and lure away consumers.  Id.; see also Promatek, 
300 F.3d at 812-13 (finding initial-interest confusion actionable under Lanham Act 
where competitor used marks as meta tags to lure consumers searching for competitor’s 
products).  Likewise, the Second Circuit reversed a 12(b)(6) dismissal in a keyword ad 
case, holding that use of the plaintiff’s marks as keywords for search-engine ads is a 
“use in commerce” sufficient to state a claim for infringement if the alleged use is likely 
to cause confusion.  Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 130.  Other Circuits are in accord.  See Rosetta 
Stone, 676 F.3d at 151-60; Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1144-45.  Moreover, the Fifth 
Circuit has held that the issue of likelihood of confusion in a keyword case is a fact issue 
properly decided by the jury.  See College Network, 378 F. App’x at 414 n.5.  




Adler’s allegations are not based on a competitor using his marks as keywords 
for legitimate comparative advertising purposes, but instead center on McNeil’s use of 
Adler’s marks in a classic bait-and-switch scheme designed to confuse and lure away 
consumers.  Adler’s complaint is more than sufficient to a state claim for trademark 
infringement and unfair competition based on initial-interest confusion.   
C. Whether McNeil’s bait-and-switch scheme creates a likelihood of 
confusion sufficient to prove Adler’s infringement claim is a fact 
question that cannot properly be decided on a motion to dismiss. 
Believing a plaintiff’s mark must be visible in the defendant’s ad, the district court 
concluded Adler did not allege a likelihood of confusion as a matter of law.43  But as 
the Court held in Southwest Recreational and College Network, whether a competitor’s 
misuse of a trademark online creates a likelihood of confusion is a fact issue.  Adler 
alleges a plausible claim of initial-interest confusion based on McNeil’s use of his marks 
in a bait-and-switch scheme, and likelihood of confusion cannot be properly decided 
on a motion to dismiss. 
Prior case law from the Court does not support deciding likelihood of confusion 
on a motion to dismiss, particularly when faced with detailed and specific allegations 
such as those made by Adler.  The district court relied on College Network, 378 F. App’x 
at 414 n.5, as holding that use of a competitor’s mark in keyword ads does not “compel” 
a finding of likelihood of confusion,44—a point not in dispute.  But there, the issue was 
                                           
43 ROA.203. 
44 ROA.201. 




whether the trademark owner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law after a full 
trial, notwithstanding that the jury found no infringement.  College Network, 378 F. App’x 
at 406.  The Court simply found that “[t]he jury was permitted to view the keyword-
search process and visually compare the companies’ websites.”  Id. at 414 n.5.  This 
approach makes sense because likelihood of confusion in a trademark case is a question 
of fact.  Viacom, 891 F.3d at 192.  Assessing whether a likelihood of confusion exists 
requires a review of all the evidence.  Xtreme Lashes, 576 F.3d at 227.  Rather than 
holding that likelihood of confusion in keyword advertising cases is a question of law, 
the Court in College Network held it is a fact issue properly resolved by the jury.   
Cases from other jurisdictions also support this Court’s approach in College 
Network, rejecting the idea that likelihood of confusion in a keyword case should be 
decided at the motion to dismiss stage.  A court in the District of Maryland recently 
rejected a motion to dismiss in a keyword case where the defendant likewise argued its 
use of the plaintiff’s marks as a keyword could not result in a likelihood of confusion 
as a matter of law.  See Seguros R. Vasquez, Inc. v. Aguirre, No. 19-CV-1484, 2020 WL 
3447754, at *2 (D. Md. June 24, 2020).  The court refused to adopt this reasoning, 
holding, “a claim of trademark infringement based on the use of the mark in a Google 
keyword cannot be dismissed as a matter of law at this early stage of the proceedings, 
before [plaintiff] has even been afforded an opportunity for discovery.”  Id.   




Likewise, the Northern District of Illinois denied a motion to dismiss in a 
keyword advertising case where the text of the ad did not include the marks or refer to 
either plaintiff or defendant.  See Morningware, Inc. v. Hearthware Home Prods., Inc., 673 
F.Supp.2d 630, 636 (N.D. Ill. 2009).  The court held that a claim for initial-interest 
confusion was properly stated, reasoning that use of the plaintiff’s mark as a keyword 
with the unlabeled ad could mislead consumers who had searched for the plaintiff into 
believing the link was associated with the plaintiff.  Id.   
And last year, a district court in Connecticut denied a motion to dismiss in a 
similar keyword advertising case.  See TSI Prods., Inc., v. Armor All/STP Prods., Co., No. 
17-CV-1131, 2019 WL 4600310 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2019).  In TSI, the plaintiff alleged 
a competitor infringed its trademark by purchasing TSI’s marks “to use in keyword 
advertising and [by] using TSI’s mark in a manner likely to cause consumer confusion.”  
Id. at *4.  As here, the defendant sought dismissal, arguing the complaint failed to state 
a plausible claim for infringement because “the purchase of a competitor’s marks as 
keywords alone, without additional behavior that confuses consumers, is not 
actionable.”  Id. at *5.  The court denied the motion, finding that the complaint, “pleads 
more than simply the purchase of a competitor’s marks.”  Id.  The court found the 
plaintiff plausibly pleaded a claim for infringement because the defendant’s “keyword 
purchases, combined with the look and placement of that defendant’s advertisement, 
create a search results page which misleads, confuses or misdirects a consumer 




searching for a trademarked brand to the website of a competitor in a manner in which 
the source of the products offered for sale by the competitor is unclear.”  Id. (quoting 
Edible Arrangements, 2016 WL 4074121, at *11).  The same is true here, and Adler 
properly pleaded his claims under the Lanham Act.   
Courts have long recognized that, even if the ads are labeled as such, use of a 
competitor’s marks as keywords for online ads—“even as to sponsored links that did 
not display the trademarked term”—can state a plausible claim for initial-interest 
confusion and should not be dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  See, e.g., Tokyo Broad. 
Sys. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., No. 08-CV-06622, 2009 WL 10668456, at *9-11 (C.D. Ca. 
Aug. 12, 2009).  These decisions make clear that the case law does not support dismissal 
of a keyword case based on likelihood of confusion as a matter of law.  See, e.g., St George 
Exec. Shuttle, LLC v. W. Trails Charters & Tours, No. 17-CV-900, 2018 WL 3350348, at 
**2-3 (D. Utah July 19, 2018).  
In the face of the overwhelming case law on this point, the district court relied 
on five cases from other jurisdictions to support its holding that, when the 
advertisement does not visibly incorporate the plaintiff’s mark in the text of the ad, 
there can be no likelihood of confusion as a matter of law.45  But these cases do not 
support the district court’s approach or McNeil’s claim for dismissal. 
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First, the court relied on 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th 
Cir. 2013), believing the Tenth Circuit held that summary judgement was proper on 
likelihood of confusion because the subject ads did not contain the plaintiff’s marks.  
But that is not what the Tenth Circuit held.  In fact, it specifically rejected that approach.  
In 1-800 Contacts, the trial court held summary judgment was proper on likelihood of 
confusion where the ads did not include the trademark in the text.  See 1-800 Contacts, 
Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1173-74 (D. Utah 2010).  Although noting 
the argument had “some attraction,” the Tenth Circuit held that, “if confusion does 
indeed arise, the advertiser’s choice of keyword may make a difference to the 
infringement analysis even if the consumer cannot discern that choice.”  722 F.3d at 
1243.  Instead of deciding likelihood of confusion based on a blanket rule involving 
visibility, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment record in light of the 
multifactor test for likelihood of confusion, noting the evidence showed a net confusion 
rate of just 7.4%.  Id. at 1243-49.  Here, unlike in 1-800 Contacts, Adler has not had the 
chance for discovery to develop or present such evidence, but if allowed, Adler would 
be able to show McNeil’s bait-and-switch scheme creates a drastically higher level of 
consumer confusion—more than sufficient to prove a claim under the Lanham Act.46  
As another court observed: “1-800-Contacts thus does not hold, as a matter of law, that 
                                           
46 See e.g. ROA.292-93 (Alleging a double-blind survey found that McNeil’s ads resulted in a net 
confusion rate between 34% and 44%). 




no trademark infringement claim can be based on a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s 
trademark as a keyword search term.”  Seguros R. Vasquez, 2020 WL 3447754, at *3. 
Next, the court cited three cases in which the plaintiff was denied a preliminary 
injunction on keyword advertising claims.  Significantly, none of these decisions 
involved a motion to dismiss or determined that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim as 
a matter of law.  Instead, each merely decided the plaintiff had not carried the heavy 
burden of entitlement to a preliminary injunction.47  In Tartell, while the court denied 
the plaintiff a preliminary injunction because it found the plaintiff had not proven it 
was substantially likely to succeed, the court noted that “[t]he ultimate finder of fact 
may disagree.”  2013 WL 12036430, at *7.  The case then proceeded to discovery on 
the infringement claim.48  Similarly, in USA Nutraceuticals Group, the court recognized 
that a preliminary injunction is a “drastic remedy” and denied the requested relief, 
noting that “the use of a keyword encompassing a competitor’s terms does not necessarily 
produce an infringing advertisement.”  165 F. Supp. 3d at 1266 (emphasis added).  The 
court had previously denied two separate motions to dismiss the trademark claims.49  
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Moreover, the court noted that, unlike in the Fifth Circuit, “[i]nitial interest confusion 
has yet to be welcomed in the Eleventh Circuit.”  Id. at 1268.  And in Infogroup, the 
parties’ dispute ultimately proceeded to a jury trial where plaintiffs prevailed.50  The 
court rejected defendant’s motion for judgment or a new trial—which was based on 
the argument that the court’s prior rulings on confusion were correct—because 
additional evidence was submitted at trial.51  In rejecting a similar argument, the court 
explained, “just because there was not persuasive evidence before the Court at the 
preliminary injunction stage, does not mean there was not any evidence presented at 
trial nearly four years later.”52  Here, Adler has not sought a preliminary injunction, and 
none of these cases relied on by the district court support dismissing Adler’s claims as 
a matter of law.   
The only case cited by the district court that involves a motion to dismiss is J.G. 
Wentworth, an unpublished decision from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  J.G. 
Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P’hip v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-CV-0597, 2007 WL 30115 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007).  In that case, the court held that use of another’s trademarks in 
both keywords and meta tags could not state a claim for likelihood of confusion because 
the marks were not visible to the consumer.  Id. at *6-8.  In its decision, the court 
recognized that “numerous cases from other jurisdictions” had extended such 
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protection for initial-interest confusion to trademark holders, but the Third Circuit had 
not yet done so.  Id. at *7.  Recognizing the Ninth Circuit’s Brookfield decision as the 
seminal case supporting such a claim, the court simply disagreed with that opinion and 
the legal basis for such a claim.  Id. 
The J.G. Wentworth opinion does not reflect the law in the Fifth Circuit.  In fact, 
neither the Fifth Circuit nor any lower court within the Fifth Circuit had ever cited or 
relied on J.G. Wentworth before this case.  Likely, that is because the Fifth Circuit and 
district courts in the Circuit have consistently held that a claim for infringement based 
on use of a mark in online advertising does not require the mark to be visible.  See, e.g., 
Sw. Recreational Indus., 2002 WL 32783971, at *7-8; College Network, 378 F. App’x at 414 
n.5; Ben Abbott & Assocs., 2020 WL 5633006, at *5-6; Am. CAN!, 2019 WL 1112667, at 
*10; Abraham, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 423.  Moreover, while J.G. Wentworth rejected Brookfield, 
the Fifth Circuit has cited Brookfield approvingly and explained how it and other similar 
decisions are consistent with Fifth Circuit jurisprudence on this issue.  See Sw. Recreational 
Indus., 2002 WL 32783971, at *7-8.  Courts in jurisdictions where the use of meta tags 
and keywords is recognized as supporting claims under the initial-interest theory have 
similarly rejected J.G. Wentworth’s holding.  See, e.g., Morningware, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 637-
38.  The same should be true here. 




D. Likelihood of confusion must be determined based on the Fifth 
Circuit’s “digits of confusion,” which support Adler’s claims. 
In assessing whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the Court has articulated 
a non-exhaustive list of factors that must be considered, known as the “digits of 
confusion.”  Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2004).  
While the number of factors weighed by the court can vary from case to case, there are 
typically eight digits to weigh when determining whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion: (1) strength of the mark; (2) mark similarity; (3) product or service similarity; 
(4) outlet and purchaser identity; (5) advertising media identity; (6) defendant’s intent; 
(7) actual confusion; and (8) care exercised by potential purchasers.  See All. for Good 
Gov’t v. Coal. for Better Gov’t, 901 F.3d 498, 508 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Mary Kay, Inc. v. 
Weber, 601 F. Supp. 2d 839, 857 (N.D. Tex. 2009).  While the district court recognized 
that courts “must consider the ‘digits of confusion’” to determine whether the 
defendant’s use is likely to cause confusion, here it decided, without citation to any 
authority, that the factors need not be considered if the plaintiff’s marks are not visible 
to consumers in the defendant’s ad.53  No authority supports that conclusion. 
To the contrary, in College Network, the Court applied the digits in a keyword case 
to evaluate the likelihood of confusion despite the plaintiff’s argument that it should 
apply the Ninth Circuit’s test.  378 F. App’x at 414.  Other courts have similarly applied 
the digits to a keyword case.  See, e.g., Abraham, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 417-28.  Moreover, 
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the Court has warned that “we must consider the application of each digit in light of 
the specific circumstance of the case; otherwise we risk inadvertently lowering the 
standard of confusion.”  Scott Fetzer Co., 381 F.3d 477.   
The district court’s approach conflicts with Fifth Circuit trademark 
jurisprudence.  Likelihood of confusion is usually better determined after the record is 
developed, including in keyword ad cases.  See Hilton Head Island Dev. Co., LLC v. DuBois, 
No. 13-CV-3510, 2014 WL 12607844, at *3 (D.S.C. July 1, 2014) (denying motion to 
dismiss by law firm in trademark infringement case based on keyword ads); see also 
Xtreme Lashes, 576 F.3d at 227 (a fact question).  If the digits were properly applied in 
this case—as was done in the companion Reyes case where the court found that seven 
of the eight digits weighed in Adler’s favor—the digits overwhelmingly favor rejecting 
dismissal.54   
(1) Strength of the Marks:  As the district court concluded, Adler’s marks are 
strong.55  Conceptual strength turns on distinctiveness, which the law breaks into five 
categories: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) fanciful.  
Streamline Prod. Sys., Inc. v. Streamline Mfg. Inc., 851 F.3d 440, 451 (5th Cir. 2017).  Courts 
deem marks falling into the latter three categories inherently distinctive (i.e., strong).  Id.  
Here, the Adler Marks used by McNeil are JIM ADLER, THE HAMMER, THE 
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TEXAS HAMMER, and EL MARTILLO TEJANO.  At the very least, these marks 
are suggestive and inherently distinctive for use with legal services. 
Moreover, Adler’s marks are commercially strong given Adler’s extensive 
duration of use, extensive advertising, and public recognition.  See Firebirds Int’l, LLC v. 
Firebird Rest. Grp., LLC, 397 F. Supp. 3d. 847, 861-62 (N.D. Tex. 2019);  Binder v. 
Disability Grp., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (evidence law firm 
“extensively marketed and advertised their services and worked to build their reputation 
based around their name” supported finding mark strong).  In a keyword case, the 
strength of a mark is probative of confusion.  CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 
10-CV-3542, 2012 WL 5269213, at *17 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 25, 2012).  “[A] user searching 
for a distinctive term is more likely to be looking for a particular product, and therefore 
could be more susceptible to confusion when sponsored links appear that advertise a 
similar product from a different source.”  Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149.  
McNeil’s use of Adler’s strong marks as search terms is strong evidence of a likelihood 
of confusion.  See id.  This digit heavily favors Adler.   
(2) Similarity of the Marks:  McNeil uses Adler’s exact marks as keywords to 
manipulate search engine results and confuse consumers.  A defendant’s use of marks 
identical to the plaintiff’s in connection with search-engine advertising creates a “strong 




likelihood of confusion.”  Binder, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.  Because the marks are 
identical, this factor strongly favors Adler.56 
(3) Similarity of the Products:  Adler and McNeil promote the same product—
legal services for personal injury claims.  See Binder, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (services 
“identical” where parties sought “clients for social security disability cases”).  Though 
McNeil has inserted herself into the market as a middleman referral service and is not 
a lawyer or a law firm, her profits undeniably derive from connecting consumers with 
legal services.  Illustrating that point is her use of the name Accident Injury Legal Center 
and her offer of free consultations.57  As the lower court recognized in the companion 
Reyes case, “[t]he fact the defendant is a competitor providing the same class of services 
weighs heavily in favor of finding the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark is likely to 
cause confusion.”58  This factor strongly favors Adler. 
(4) Outlet and Purchaser Identity:  Adler and McNeil advertise to the same 
consumers in the same markets, i.e., Texas personal injury plaintiffs and their families.59  
The fact that McNeil promotes the same class of services for the same general purpose 
to reach the same potential consumers weighs heavily in favor of a finding McNeil’s 
use of Adler’s marks is likely to cause confusion.  See Edible Arrangements, 2016 WL 
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4074121, at *8; see also Reyes Report 20 (noting the parties “compete to reach the same 
consumers: Texas personal injury plaintiffs and their families”).60 
(5) Advertising Media Identity:  Adler and McNeil both use keyword ads for 
internet searches conducted on mobile devices, and McNeil concedes as much.61  This 
factor strongly favors Adler.62 
(6) Defendant’s Intent:  McNeil uses Adler’s marks to intentionally confuse 
consumers searching specifically for Adler so that they contact McNeil instead.63  
“Although not necessary to a finding of likelihood of confusion, a defendant’s intent to 
confuse may alone be sufficient to justify an inference that there is a likelihood of 
confusion.”  Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d at 481.  Because McNeil intentionally uses 
Adler’s marks to confuse consumers searching for Adler, this factor should weigh 
heavily in Adler’s favor.64 
Moreover, “[a] showing that the defendant intended to use the allegedly 
infringing mark with knowledge of the predecessor’s mark may give rise to a 
presumption that the defendant intended to cause public confusion.”  Conan Props., Inc. 
v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 151 n.2 (5th Cir.1985).  As in the Reyes Report, the 
court should presume McNeil acted in bad faith, as she undoubtedly had knowledge of 
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Adler and his marks when she began using identical marks in her fraudulent scheme.65  
McNeil would not purchase Adler’s marks as keywords and bid increasing amounts of 
money to manipulate search-engine results if she did not know their strength among 
consumers. 
Under the facts alleged in the complaint, “[t]he circumstances of this case show 
. . . that [McNeil] intended to capitalize on the potential for confusion.”  Smack Apparel, 
550 F.3d at 482.  “The nature of [McNeil’s] scheme leaves little doubt as to Defendants’ 
bad-faith intent to trade on [Adler’s] goodwill and reputation.”66  The fact McNeil uses 
Adler’s marks as keyword advertisements for her services is, at the very least, sufficient 
to create a question of fact on intent and likelihood of confusion.  See Clearline Techs. 
Ltd. v. Cooper B-Line, No. 11-CV-1420, 2012 WL 12893491, at *15 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 
2012) (fact issue precluded summary judgment in case involving meta tags).  Adler is 
entitled to discovery on this issue, which will allow him to show through evidence that 
McNeil had acted with bad-faith to confuse.  Because McNeil knows of Adler’s marks 
and intentionally uses those marks to confuse consumers searching for Adler on mobile 
devices, this digit weighs heavily in favor of Adler.  See Reyes Report 21 (“This factor 
weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion or, at the very least, is sufficient 
to create a question of fact on intent and the likelihood of confusion.”).67 
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(7) Actual Confusion:  Adler is not required to offer evidence of actual 
confusion, given how difficult it is to find and prove in trademark and unfair 
competition cases.  As the Court has made clear, “[i]t is well established . . . that evidence 
of actual confusion is not necessary for a finding of likelihood of confusion.”  Smack 
Apparel, 550 F.3d at 483.  “When a plaintiff presents no evidence of actual confusion, 
the digit is at best neutral.”  Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. Healix, Inc., No. 17-CV-357, 
2018 WL 1801149, at *20 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2018).  Hence, as the lower court found 
in the Reyes Report, this factor is neutral at best, particularly at the pre-discovery stage.  
See Reyes Report 21 (“Plaintiffs are not required to plead or provide evidence of actual 
confusion at the motion to dismiss stage.”).68   
Nevertheless, Adler has offered allegations, in the form of a double-blind survey 
showing a net confusion rate of at least 34% caused by McNeil’s use of Adler’s marks, 
demonstrating that McNeil’s scheme is causing actual confusion in the marketplace.69   
Consumer surveys are probative of actual confusion. See e.g., Viacom Int’l, 891 F.3d at 
197 (“To show actual confusion, a plaintiff may rely on anecdotal instances of consumer 
confusion or consumer surveys.”).  Courts routinely credit survey evidence showing a 
net confusion rate of less than 20% as indicative of a likelihood of confusion.  See 
generally J. Thomas McCarthy, 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
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COMPETITION §32:185 (5th ed. 2018).  For instance, the Fifth Circuit found a survey 
with a 15% net confusion rate “strong evidence indicating a likelihood of confusion.”  
Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980).  Adler’s 
survey allegations are strong evidence of confusion.   
(8) Care Exercised by Purchasers:  As alleged in Adler’s complaint, McNeil is 
not purchasing Adler’s marks on desktops, but instead targets only those consumers 
searching on mobile devices.  McNeil does so because she knows consumers searching 
for Adler on mobile devices are more likely to be confused by ads using Adler’s marks.70  
At this point in the case, there is no evidence to support any other finding as to the 
degree of care exercised by potential consumers.  Given the stage of the proceedings, 
this final factor should weigh in favor of Adler.71   
* * * 
 As the district court found in the companion Reyes case, “[t]aking as true the 
allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint and considering them in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiffs as measured against the eight digits, Plaintiffs plausibly show that there is a 
likelihood of confusion.”72  The court should have weighed the digits and reached the 
same result in this case.  Determining likelihood of confusion requires consideration of 
the digits of confusion, and applying them here should lead to a finding that Adler has 
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plausibly stated claims against McNeil for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition.  The lower court could not properly decide if likelihood of confusion was 
plausibly alleged without considering the digits.  
III. Alternatively, Adler should have been granted leave to file an amended 
complaint to cure any deficiency in pleading likelihood of confusion. 
In addition to objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss 
the complaint, Adler also moved to file an amended complaint to address the finding 
that he had not sufficiently pleaded likelihood of confusion.73  Specifically, Adler sought 
to file an amended complaint to include the fact that he had commissioned a double-
blind survey of consumers which found McNeil’s ads yielded a net confusion rate of 
34% to 44%.74  Wrongly believing Adler could not allege likelihood of confusion as a 
matter of law because the Adler Marks are not visible in the text of McNeil’s ads, the 
district court denied the motion for leave to file the amended complaint as futile.75  But 
the factual allegations offered by Adler in the amended complaint are strong evidence 
of likelihood of confusion, and Adler should have been allowed to file his amended 
complaint. 
A survey showing a net confusion rate of at least 34% is strong evidence of actual 
confusion.  Consumer surveys are probative of actual confusion, e.g., Viacom Int’l, 891 
F.3d at 197 (“To show actual confusion, a plaintiff may rely on anecdotal instances of 
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consumer confusion or consumer surveys.”), and evidence of actual confusion “is the 
best evidence of a likelihood of confusion,” e.g., Xtreme Lashes, LLC, 576 F.3d at 229.  
In fact, “while very little proof of actual confusion would be necessary to prove the 
likelihood of confusion, an almost overwhelming amount of proof would be necessary 
to refute such proof.”  World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 
482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971). 
Moreover, courts routinely credit survey evidence showing a net confusion rate 
of less than 20% as indicative of a likelihood of confusion.  See generally McCarthy, supra, 
§32:185.  For instance, the Court found a survey with a 15% net confusion rate “strong 
evidence indicating a likelihood of confusion.”  Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d at 507.  Lower 
courts in the Fifth Circuit have followed that guidance.  See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Football 
Club, Ltd. v. Am.’s Team Props., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 622, 641 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (noting 
confusion rates of 19% to 39% “are within the range accepted by courts—generally 15 
percent—in assessing likelihood of confusion”); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 
F. Supp. 1513, 1549 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (survey showing net confusion rate between 15% 
and 17% was reliable evidence of actual confusion).   
Rule 15(a) governs a plaintiff’s request for leave to amend its complaint.  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).  Where, as here, a motion to amend is denied based on futility, the 
Fifth Circuit applies the de novo standard of review, and reviews the lower court’s 
decision under the same standard used to review the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).  




Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016).  The Court has 
repeatedly characterized Rule 15(a) as “evinc[ing] a bias in favor of granting leave to 
amend,” and a district court “must have a substantial reason to deny a request for leave 
to amend.”  Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 566 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(internal quotes omitted).  Fifth Circuit case law holds that granting leave to amend is 
especially appropriate when the trial court has dismissed the complaint for failure to 
state a claim.  Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 
329 (5th Cir. 2002).   
While the district court appears to have believed McNeil’s ads could not create a 
likelihood of consumer confusion without visibly including Adler’s marks in the text of 
the ads, the results of Adler’s survey show otherwise.  Even if the district court believed 
Adler’s original pleadings fell short, Adler should have been allowed to file his amended 
complaint to offer this strong evidence of actual confusion caused by McNeil’s scheme.   
IV. Adler alleged plausible claims under the Lanham Act, and the district 
court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Adler’s state 
law claims. 
Based on its belief that Adler could not allege plausible claims under the Lanham 
Act because McNeil does not visibly include Adler’s marks in the text of her ads, the 
trial court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Adler’s state law 
claims in dismissing Adler’s federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6).76  Because the district 
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court was wrong to dismiss Adler’s federal claims, it should have retained supplemental 
jurisdiction over Adler’s related state law claims.   
Adler does not dispute that a district court, once it has dismissed all claims over 
which it has original jurisdiction, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
related state law claims.  28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3).  No doubt, district courts “enjoy wide 
discretion in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim 
once all federal claims are dismissed.”  Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993).  
This Court reviews a district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 
§1367 for abuse of discretion.  Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 
595, 599 (5th Cir. 2009).  Whether a district court abuses its discretion after §1367(c)(3) 
has been satisfied depends on “common law factors of judicial economy, convenience, 
fairness, and comity.”  Enochs v. Lampasas Cty., 641 F.3d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011).  
And the Court has articulated the general rule that, “a court should decline to exercise 
jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated 
before trial.”  Brookshire, 554 F.3d at 602. 
However, as laid out herein, because the allegations in Adler’s amended 
complaint are more than sufficient to state his Lanham Act claims for trademark 
infringement and unfair competition, those federal claims should not have been 
dismissed, and so supplemental jurisdiction properly exists over each of Adler’s state-
law claims.  See 28 U.S.C. §1367(a).  In fact, in the companion Reyes case, the court 




recognized Adler had adequately pleaded and could pursue identical state law claims.77  
The same should be true here.   
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Adler asks the Court to reverse the district court’s August 29, 
2020 order and judgment granting McNeil’s motion to dismiss, and remand this case 
for a determination on the merits of Adler’s federal and state law claims. 
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